In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the signal of the firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset.
Introduction
Models of financial markets with the presence of an insider or informational asymmetries have a large literature, see e.g. Karatzas and Pikovsky (1996) the insider does not affect the stock price dynamics, and the privileged information is a functional of the stock price process: the maximum, the final value, etc. As pointed by Danilova (2010) , in an equilibrium situation market prices are determined by the demand of market participants, so in such a situation the privileged information cannot be a functional of the stock price process because this implies the knowledge of future demand and it is unrealistic. Then the privileged information is exogenous like the value of the fundamental price, or some signal of it, or the announcement time of the release of the fundamental price, which evolves independently of the demand. The questions considered in this paper deal with the existence of an equilibrium and the properties of the insider's optimal strategies. Moreover another question studied is the efficiency of the market, namely the conditions in which market prices converge to the fundamental one. These problems have been addressed in different works, with different degrees of generality, and with very different types of insider's privileged information and demands of the uninformed traders.
The original model is due to Kyle (1985) , he considers three kind of actors in the market: market makers, uninformed traders and one insider who knows the fundamental or liquidation value of an asset at certain fixed released time, there is also, in the model, a price function establishing the relation between market prices and the total demand. He works in the discrete time setting, and with Gaussian random walks as noises. Back (1992) extends the work to the continuous time case. These are the two seminal papers.
From then there has been several generalizations of the model: Back and Pedersen (1998) The present paper extends the previous contributions in different ways. We consider general noises for the demand processes, general pricing rules, random release times, and general dynamic information, all in the same model. Then, we study in detail which are the necessary conditions needed to have an equilibrium.
These conditions are new in the literature. Specifically we consider the very general case in which an insider has access to some signal related to the firm value, which is in fact released at some stopping time. We first consider the case where the insider knows the random time of release of information and then the case where this is also unknown to her. We study these two situations in the same framework with the purpose of analyzing equilibrium and efficiency of the market.
Except for the multivariate setting of Lasserre (2004) and the risk-aversion considered in previous works, this is a general setting for the previous extensions of the Kyle-Back model, as we show through different examples.
Our study shows explicitly how equilibrium is a specific state of the market induced by the interplay of agents with different roles and asymmetric information. Indeed, the market makers set rational prices which are assumed to be a function H of the aggregate demand and time. For such H given, the insider optimizes her position to maximize her expected wealth. The necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium show how this optimization is possible only for some given pricing rules and under some available information flows.
In this study we show that the presence of the insider can be beneficial to the market from an efficiency point of view. In fact, if the insider knows the random release time, then the market is efficient. However, if this time of release is unknown also to the insider, then the market is not fully efficient, nevertheless equilibrium can be reached if the sensitivity of prices decreases in time according to the survival probability of the announcement. In other words, the prices become more stable as the announcement time approaches.
As far as we know this generality of the insider's information together with the presence of a random time of release has never been studied before. Moreover, our contribution includes also very general dynamics for the demand process. In fact the insider's demand is allowed to be a general semimartingale. The present paper includes also various examples in which we give explicit insider's optimal strategies for a given pricing rule and define the concept of admissibility for pricing rules and insider strategies. Here we show how our results, coupled with the mathematical tools of enlargement of filtrations or filtering techniques, allow to finding the insider's optimal strategy in various cases presented in the literature, but here treated in a unified framework.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the model that gives rise the stock prices and we discuss the insider's optimal strategies for a given pricing rule and define the concept of admissibility for pricing rules and insider strategies. In section 3 and 4 we discuss what happens when the release time is known to the insider or not, respectively. Finally, in section 5, we give some examples.
The model and equilibrium
We consider a market with two assets, a stock of a firm and a bank account with interest rate r equal to zero for the sake of simplicity. With abuse of terminology we will just write prices even though they are sometimes "discounted" prices. The trading is continuous in time over the period [0, ∞) and it is order driven. There is a (possibly random) release time τ < ∞ a.s., when the fundamental value of the stock is revealed. The fundamental value process, that we shall define in a precise way later, is denoted by V . We shall denote the market price of the stock at time t by P t . Just after the revelation time the price of the stock coincides with the fundamental value. Then we consider P t defined only on t ≤ τ . In principle, it is possible that P t = V t if t ≤ τ, stopping our studies at this (random) time of release.
We assume that all the random variables and processes mentioned are defined in the same, complete, probability space (Ω, F , P) and that the filtrations are complete and right-continuous by taking, if it is necessary, the usual augmentation of them, as we shall specify below.
There are three kinds of traders. A large number of liquidity traders, who trade for liquidity or hedging reasons, an informed trader or insider, who has privileged information about the firm and can deduce its fundamental value, and the market makers, who set the market price and clear the market.
The agents and equilibrium
Let X be the demand process of the informed trader. At time t, her information is given by H t and her flow of information is given by the filtration H = (H t ) t≥0 . It is natural to assume that X is an H-predictable process. The informed trader, like any other trader, observes the market prices P and, in addition, she has access to the firm value, having access to some signal process η directly related to the firm value. Moreover, she will have some knowledge about the random time τ . In the sequel we will consider two cases:
• H t =σ(P s , η s , τ, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), i.e. the informed trader has knowledge of the time of release of information
• H t =σ(P s , η s , τ ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), i.e. the informed trader has no knowledge of this release time, but she will instantly know when it happens.
Hereσ denotes the usual augmentation of a natural filtration σ (see [32] , Ch. I, Def. 4.13). That is, e.g.,
where N is the family of P-null sets in F , and σ(P s , η s , τ, 0 ≤ s ≤ r) is the natural filtration generated by P, η, and τ.
In both the cases above, the insider has access to the fundamental value V which, in terms of the insider's information flow, is assumed to be a càdlàg H-martingale such that σ
is well defined (where
c indicates the continuous part of the quadratic variation of V ) and V is taken in the form:
where f is a non-negative deterministic function and η is some signal process related to the firm value. The explicit presence of f gives a structure to the relationship between the type of signal and the fundamental value, see Example 22 and Remark 10.
Let Z be the aggregate demand process of the liquidity traders. We recall that these are a large number of traders motivated by liquidity or hedging reasons. They are perceived as constituting noise in the market, thus also called noise traders. From the insider's perspective we assume that Z is a continuous H-martingale, independent of η and V , such that that σ
is well defined.
Market makers clear the market giving the market prices. They rely on the information given by the total aggregate demand Y := X + Z which they observe and, just like the noise traders, they instantly know about the time of release of information when that occurs. Hence their information flow is: F = (F t ) t≥0 , where
Due to the competition among market makers, the market prices are rational, or competitive, in the sense
Finally we suppose that market makers give market prices through a pricing rule, which consists of a formula, here assumed of the form:
involving
where λ ∈ C 1 is a strictly positive deterministic function, H ∈ C 1,2 , H(t, ·) is strictly increasing for all t ≥ 0.
Note that F t =σ(P s , τ ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), for all t. We have the following definition.
Definition 1 Denote the class of such pairs (H, λ) above by H. An element of H is called a pricing rule.
The informed trader is assumed risk-neutral and she aims at maximizing her expected final wealth. Let W be the wealth process corresponding to insider's portfolio X. We introduce the following definitions.
Definition 2 A strategy X is called optimal with respect to a price process P if it maximizes E(W τ ).
Definition 3 Let (H, λ) ∈ H and consider a strategy X. The triple (H, λ, X) is an (a local) equilibrium, if the price process P · := H(·, ξ · ) is rational, given X, that is
and the strategy X is (locally) optimal, given (H, λ).
Remark 4
It is important to remark that the effect of the total demand in prices is due not only to the function λ, but also to the function H. In fact, as we shall see later, in some equilibrium cases, see Proposition 13,
and some authors give the name market depth to the quantity
Here and in the sequel ∂ i H denotes the derivative with respect to the i th variable. So, to say that the market depth is constant is not equivalent to say that λ(t) is constant. Only if the equilibrium pricing rule is linear, the two statements are equivalent. See Back and Pedersen (1998).
Wealth and admissible strategies
To illustrate the relationship among the processes V, P, X, and W we first consider a multi-period model where trades are made at times i = 1, 2, . . . N, and where τ = N is random. If at time i − 1, there is an order to buy X i − X i−1 shares, its cost will be P i (X i − X i−1 ), so, there is a change in the bank account given by
Then the total (cumulated) change at τ = N is
and due to the convergence of the market and the fundamental prices at time τ = N , there is the extra income: X N V N . So, the total wealth W τ at τ is
Consider now the continuous time setting where we have the processes X, P, and V, and we take N trading periods, where N is random and the trading times are: 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ ... ≤ t N = τ, then we have
so if the time between trades goes to zero we will have
where (and throughout the whole article) P t− = lim s↑t P s a.s. We shall asume that X is an H-predictable càdlàg semimartingale, so that the stochastic integrals above can be seen as Itô's integrals. Moreover, by applying Itô's formula to P t = H(t, ξ t ), t ≥ 0, where ξ is now a càdlàg H-semimartingale, we can see that P
is also an H-semimartingale.
In the next subsection we discuss the characterization of an insider's optimal strategy in equilibrium in terms of fundamental value and insider information. Namely, we consider a process X that is optimal in the sense that it maximizes
for a pricing rule (H, λ) ∈ H. However for technical and modelling reasons, we require additional properties to the triplet (H, λ, X). In this way, we characterize the admissible triplets (H, λ, X) as those processes X (that include, by hypothesis, the process X ≡ 0) and price functions (H, λ) ∈ H satisfying:
θ s ds, for all t ≥ 0,where M is a continuous H-martingale, A a finite variation H-predictable process with A t = 0<s≤t (X s − X s− ), and θ a càdlàg H-adapted process
Recall that ∂ i indicates the derivative w.r.t. the i th argument.
Remark 5 Note that, since (X t ) t≥0 is a càdlàg H-predictable process, its martingale part cannot have jumps, see Corollary 2.31 in Jacod and Shiryaev (1987) . Similarly, we have chosen Z to be continuous before.
We can recall the essential assumptions of the model as follows. Our stochastic basis is a complete filtered space (Ω, F , F, H, P), where F ⊆ H are the filtrations defined in the subsection 2.1. Roughly speaking,
F contains information about market prices or total demand and H includes also information about the fundamental value V . We have market prices P t = H(t, ξ t ), where H is a C 1,2 function, H(t, ·) strictly increasing, ξ t = t 0 λ(s)dY s , and λ is a C 1 strictly positive function. From the rationality assumption (3) we have that P is an F-martingale. The total demand process is given by Y = X + Z , with Z an H-
and V has the structure (1). Finally the release time τ is a stopping time with respect to F and H.
The optimality condition
In the sequel we will consider two kinds of stopping times: τ bounded, or τ finite but independent of (V, P, Z). In both cases, by the assumptions that V is an H-martingale and X an H-predictable càdlàg H-semimartingale satisfying (A5) we have that E( τ 0 X t dV t ) = 0. In fact, if τ is bounded we can apply Doob's Optional Sampling Theorem and if τ is finite but independent of (V, P, Z), we have that
Hence,
First, note that
Then suppose that X is (locally) optimal and we modify only the the last jump of this strategy, by taking
(1 + εγ)∆X τ with γ an H τ − -measurable and bounded random variable and ε > 0 small enough. We recall this new strategy.
Then we obtain
Now we modify the strategy X by taking an H-adapted càdlàg process β such that X · +ε · 0 β s ds is admissible, with ε > 0 small enough.
Since we can take β t = α u 1 (u,u+h] (t) α u , with α u H u -measurable and bounded, we have
and this means that the process Ξ t , t ≥ 0:
is an H-martingale with bounded variation. In particular this implies that, for a.a. t ≥ 0,
Since τ is an H-stopping time, then for a.a. t and for a.a. ω ∈ {τ ≥ t}, or equivalently a.s. on the stochastic interval [0, τ ] , we can write
Where we have used a shorthand notation by means of d − X s as the backward integral in the sense of Revuz and Yor (1999) (see page 144), here extended to semimartingales with jumps. As a summary we have the following necessary condition to help identifying good candidates as insider's optimal strategies.
Theorem 6 An admissible triple (H, λ, X) such that X is locally optimal for the insider satisfies equations (6) and (8) 
Remark 7 Note that (6) and (8) are also true in the case that λ(t) is a piecewise strictly positive constant function including the situation treated in Danilova (2010) .
In the sequel we study two different cases of knowledge of τ from the insider's perspective. First the case in which the insider knows τ , the exact time of release of information about the firm value, then we study the case when the insider does not know τ .
Case when τ is known to the insider
Let σ(τ ) be the σ-algebra generated by τ . Then we consider the case in which σ(τ ) ⊆ H 0 . At any time t, the insider relies on the information given by:
Moreover, we assume that τ is bounded, so the analysis here below is consistent with the one of the previous section.
Necessary conditions for the equilibrium
Our first observation is that optimal strategies lead the market price to the fundamental one, making the market be efficient. In fact we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8
If τ is known to the insider and (H, λ, X) is admissible with X locally optimal, then the optimal strategy X has no jump at τ and the market is efficient, i.e.
Proof. By the assumptions (A1) and (A2), equation (8) can be rewritten:
Now by assumption (A3) and Corollary (2.4) in Revuz and Yor (1999), we have that
Analogously for the term
and consequently
Now consider equation (6) and recall that H 0 ⊆ H τ − . Since V is an H-martingale and τ ∈ H 0 , then Revuz and Yor (1999) , Ch. 2, Prop. 2.7). Moreover, since X is H-predictable, Z is continuous, and τ ∈ H 0 , we have
Therefore equation (6) gives
and if ∆X τ = 0, it turns out that
Comparing the above equation with (19) we have that H(τ, ξ τ ) = H(τ, ξ τ − ), which contradicts ∆X τ = 0,
being H strictly increasing in the second variable. This shows that a (locally) optimal strategy X has no jump at τ and, by (19) , that V τ − = H(τ, ξ τ − ) = H(τ, ξ τ ).
Remark 9
In Aase et al. (2012a) it was already observed that market efficiency, that is the convergence of market prices to the fundamental ones, is a consequence of the optimality of the insider's strategy. Here we obtain an extension of this result for a more general behavior of the fundamental value and the demand process of the noise traders.
Remark 10 This efficiency situation is also the case in Campi and Çetin (2007) . In our notation they have the signal η =τ , withτ an H-stopping time, V t = 1 {τ >1} and the release time is τ =τ ∧ 1. So, τ ∈ H 0 and it is bounded. Then, they obtain
They also assume thatτ is the first passage time of a standard Brownian motion independent of Z.
Remark 11
If we take V t ≡ V and τ ≡ 1 then we are in Back's framework (1992). There it is shown that market prices converge to V when t → 1.
Hereafter we consider necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. These conditions show the synergy between the optimal insider strategy and the pricing rule in an equilibrium state. Note that one cannot use these conditions to (uniquely) identify a pricing rule. The choice of pricing rules is not unique.
In the next subsection we will study necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for a wide class of pricing rules. Before that we have the following.
Proposition 12 Consider an admissible triple (H, λ, X). If (H, λ, X) is a local equilibrium, we have:
Proof. (i) It is just Proposition 8.
(ii) By using Itô's formula on
λ(t) , with (A2) applied, we have
ds . Now X is locally optimal, given (H, λ) , by the equation (8) and the Proposition 8 we can write:
Hence, we have
where
. By taking increments of the different terms of the previous expression when we have an infinitesimal increment of time, we can identify the predictive and martingale parts. In fact
where, for fixed u, M (u) is the martingale
Therefore we have that
Then a.s on [0, τ ], the continuous and jump parts of the r.h.s of the previous equation will be equal to zero.
and
Now, since we are in a local equilibrium, prices are rational, given X, so by taking conditional expectations w.r.t F t we have
Proposition 13 If the pricing rule H(t, ·) is linear, for any t, or the optimal strategy X is absolutely continuous, then we have:
Proof. (i) In those cases, from (13) and (15) we have dP t = dH(t, ξ t ) = λ(t)∂ 2 H(t, ξ t− )dY t , and, since P · is a martingale and λ(t)∂ 2 H(t, y) > 0, we have that Y is a local martingale.
(ii) From (13) and (15) we have that λ ′ (t)
Characterization of the equilibrium
In this subsection we shall give necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee that (H, λ, X) is an equilibrium in the context of pricing rules satisfying
Note that this condition is close to condition (ii) in Proposition 12, that is a necessary condition for the equilibrium. We shall also assume that σ 2 Z (t) is deterministic and that V is continuous. Then, when the release time τ is known and independent of Z, we have the following necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium: Theorem 14 Consider an admissible triple (H, λ, X) with (H, λ) satisfying (16) . If
(iv) Y = X + Z is an F-local martingale without jumps , then (H, λ, X) is an equilibrium. If V t = P t for all t ≤ τ , the conditions (i)-(iv) above are also necessary.
Proof. Assume (i)-(iv).
The proof follows the same steps as in Corcuera et al. (2014) . Set, for T ∈ [0, ∞),
First note that
In fact, by (16) and (A2) (also for X ≡ 0) , (H(t ∧ τ, λ 0 Z t∧τ )) t≥0 is an H-martingale, so, since Z and τ are independent, Z has independent increments, and τ is bounded, we have that,
(I(t ∧ τ, Z t∧τ , v)) t≥0 is also an H-martingale. In fact, since Z and τ are independent and Z has independent increments:
and we have that
We can take the derivative under the integral sign because H(τ (ω) , ·) is monotone and E(H(τ, λ 0 Z τ )) < ∞ and, from (16) we obtain
where C(t, v) is a function depending only on t and v. Now since (I(t ∧ τ, Z t∧τ , v)) t≥0 is a martingale, it turns out that C(t, v) = 0 a.a. t ≥ 0. Then we obtain that
Now, consider any admissible strategy X, by using Itô's formula, we have
By construction, ξ 0 = 0, by (i) dξ t = λ 0 dY t . Now we have that
Also by (17) and the fact that V and Z are independent,
then using (17) and (18), and the fact that Z has not jumps, we get
Subtracting [P, X] τ from both sides and rearranging the terms, we obtain
We have that
Then Itô's formula for H shows that the continuous local martingale part of P is ∂H ∂y (t, ξ t )dξ c t , so by using (17), we obtain
Substituting the above relationships in the right-hand side of the equation (19), it becomes
Now it is important to note that ∂ 33 I(t, y, v) does not depend on y and so ∂ 33 I(t, ξ t , V t ) does not depend of
V dt is actually fixed ω, a lower bound for any strategy. Then we will show that, taken the expectation, the right-hand side of (19) is non-positive. The result follows from the following points.
We know that
hypothesis (ii) we have a maximum value of −I(τ, ξ τ , V τ ) for our strategy.
The processes
· 0 ∂ 3 I(t, ξ t , V t )dV t and · 0 (P t − V t )dZ t are H-martingales, hence they have null expectation.
3. By (17) and H being increasing monotone, we have that ∂ 22 I > 0, and the measure
and by hypothesis (iv) we obtain the maximum value for our strategy.
4. ∂ 22 I > 0 (convexity) implies that
and has its maximum if and only if ∆X t = 0, which is assumed at (iv).
5. Assumption (iv) and (ii) together with condition (A2) guarantee the rationality of prices. In fact from condition (A2) and (16) we have that H(· ∧ τ, ξ ·∧τ ) is an F-martingale, then from (ii), and on the set {t ≤ τ } we have
Conversely, if (H, λ, X) is an equilibrium, by point 3. σ 2 M = 0 and now by (14)
Also from (16), (13) and (15) 
and, since P · is an F-martingale and λ 0 ∂ 2 H(t, y) > 0, we have that Y is an F-local martingale. Finally from point 4, ∆X t = 0 and Y = X + Z is a local martingale without jumps.
Case when τ is unknown to the insider
In this section we consider the case when the insider does not know the precise time τ of release of information.
Namely, the insider's information flow is given by:
Moreover we assume that τ finite is independent of (V, P, Z), that P(τ > t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0 and that τ has a density. Going back to Proposition 6, we can see that, on [0, τ ], equation (8) can be written as:
Here we recall that the optimal total demand X for the insider satisfies (A1) -(A6). Then we have
First of all we note that, by assumption (A3), and Corollary (2.4) in Revuz and Yor (1999) we have that
Analogously for E ( (20), we have that
Applying the Itô's formula to
, t ≤ T , and studying the limit for T → ∞, we have
Moreover, by (21), we have
where we assume that lim T →∞ P(τ >T ) λ(T ) = c < ∞. By substituting (22) and (23) into (20), we obtain the equation
In the same way we did for the stochastic process appearing in the r.h.s. of the equation (11) we can identify the predictive and martingale parts and we will obtain that
Now since we are in a local equilibrium prices are rational and by taking conditional expectations w.r.t F t , we obtain
So we have proved the following results:
Proposition 15 Consider an admissible triple (H, λ, X). Assume that lim t→∞
is a local equilibrium, we have:
Proposition 16 Consider an admissible triple (H, λ, X). If (H, λ, X) is a local equilibrium, σ 2 Z (t) is deterministic and satisfies (16) and lim t→∞ P(τ >t) λ(t) , we have:
Remark 17 Analogously to the Proposition 13, we have that the same result is true when σ 2 Z (t) is not deterministic but H(t, ·) is linear or the strategies are absolutely continuous, in both cases (27) and (28) are also true.
Remark 18
Here we can draw conclusions similar to the one in Cho (2003) where he considers a risk-averse insider (and a deterministic release time). Cho concludes that, in equilibrium, a risk-adverse insider would do most of her trading early to avoid the risk that the prices get closer to the asset value, unless the trading conditions become more favorable over time. Similarly in our case, when the (risk-neutral) insider does not know the release time of information, she would trade early in order to use her piece of information before the announcement time comes. This behavior would continue unless the price pressure decreases over time providing more favorable trading also at a later time. A similar conclusion is obtained by Baruch (2002) , who studies exactly the same problem about the effect of risk-aversion for the insider, by assuming that the noise trading is a Brownian motion with time varying instantaneous variance.
Example 19
We can consider the context of Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) where the authors assume that V and Z are arithmetic Brownian motion with variances σ V and σ Z respectively, and τ follows an exponential distribution with scale parameter µ, independent of (V, P, Z) . Then, by Proposition 16, we have that, for a.a. t and a.a. ω ∈ {t < τ },
And to have a local equilibrium, provided that V t − H(t, ξ t ) = 0, we need λ(t) = λ 0 e −µt .
Explicit insider's optimal strategies
In this section we shall apply our results to explicitly find the insider's optimal strategy in equilibrium. We will show how our general framework serves different models known in the literature presented as extensions of the Kyle-Back model. In order to perform the explicit computations we will use techniques of enlargements of filtrations.
To explain how enlargement of filtration enters the topic we consider a total demand Y = Z +X in equilibrium
given by:
Here X is absolutely continuous process with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We recall that Z is perceived by the insider as an H-martingale independent of
On the other hand, Y is a local martingale when in equilibrium, as for the cases of Theorem 14, Proposition 12 and Proposition 16. Consequently (29) becomes the Doob-Meyer decomposition of Y when we enlarge the filtration F Y with the process η. We are then into a problem of enlargement of filtrations. However, in our problem Z is fixed in advance and we want to obtain Y as a function of Z, fixed η, so we look in fact for strong solutions of (29), whereas the results on enlargement of filtrations provide weak solutions. In this sense the celebrated Yamada-Watanabe's theorem is the result, when Z is Gaussian, that can be used to is independent of Z. Then, see Example 1, page 306, in Jeulin and Yor (1985) , we have that
is a Brownian motion with variance σ 2 . Hence, prices are rational and we recognize the equilibrium strategy to be
Example 21 (Aase et al. (2012a) ) Assume that τ = 1 and suppose that Z is given by
where σ is deterministic and
Then by Jeulin (1980) , page 51,
has the same law as Z. Then
is the optimal strategy.
Example 22 (Campi and Çetin (2007)) If we want the aggregate process Y to be a Brownian motion that reaches the value −1 for the first time at timeτ , and Z is also a Brownian motion then, by Example 3 in Jeulin and Yor (1985) , page 306,
so, in this case η t ≡τ , V t ≡ 1 {τ >1} and the release time isτ ∧ 1. 
is a Brownian motion. This result can be obtained by the following proposition.
where σ s is a deterministic function, V 0 is a zero mean normal random variable, and
Proposition 24 Assume that V ar(V 1 ) = 1 and that
is a Brownian motion with B 1 = V 1 .
Proof. Denote v r := V ar(V r )
so B is a centered Gaussian process, and for s ≤ t < 1,
Then , since
we obtain that E (B t B s ) = s. So for 0 ≤ t < 1 we have that (B t ) is a standard Brownian motion. On the other hand
and, since by hypothesis v 1 = 1, this means that
and this implies, by the monotone convergence theorem, that
and that B 1 = lim t→1 B t is well defined. Now, we have, by the uniqueness of the limit in probability, that
Another view of the problem of finding the equilibrium strategy is the following. Market makers observe Y with dynamics
V is not observed. Then, the dynamics of m t := E(V t |F Y t ) can be obtained in certain cases, basically when Z and V are Gaussian diffusions, from the filtering theory, see for instance Theorem 12.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1978). Now we can try to deduce θ(V t , Y s , 0 ≤ s ≤ t) from the equilibrium condition: P t = m t .
Even if V is not a Gaussian diffusion, but can be written in the form V t = h(D t ) where h is a strictly increasing function and D is a Gaussian diffusion, we can still apply the filtering results for the couple
In the following example we use the filtering approach to find the equilibrium strategy.
Example 25 (Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010)) The release time τ is unknown (so we cannot apply Proposition 24),
B v and B z being independent Brownian motions, σ v (t) and σ z (t) deterministic functions. Then, if we look for pricing rules such that dP t = λ t dY t such that Σ t = 0, for all t ≥ T and then P t = V t for t ≥ T . But this implies, for σ
Now if we assume a smooth transition from the absolutely continuous strategy then σ 
and T is the solution of
This is exactly what Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) obtain. It is important to remark that the authors obtain a limit of optimal strategies when passing from the discrete version of the model to the continuous one. This limit strategy is such that there is an endogenously determined time T such that, if t ≤ T , then the limit strategy is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and, if t > T , the strategy is not of bounded variation. In this case an insider's optimal strategy, between times T and τ , would yield to giving out the full information to the market by making the market prices match the fundamental value. They claim that this limit strategy is not optimal for the continuous time model and that we need to consider the discrete time model to realize about its existence. However this limit strategy can be obtained has a limit of strategies for the continuous model when we restrict the class of strategies to the set of absolutely continuous strategies and we try to maximize the wealth. In fact if we have a sequence of strategies X (n) n≥1
, their corresponding wealth is given by
Then, if we assume that (X (n) , P (n) , V (n) ) u.c.p → n→∞ (X, P, V ) we obtain that
For instance if X (n) is a bounded variation process X is not necessarily a bounded variation one. Then the gain limit for this limit of strategies after T, on the set {τ > T }, is given by
Now if we take the (conditional) expectation, last term of the right-hand side cancels and we obtain that
Finally, since for the limit strategy V t− = P t− , t > T , in the conditions of Example 19, we obtain that there is a profit after T given by
Now we can justify the conditionΣ T = 0. The expected wealth for the insider with this kind of strategies is given by Then if we impose that T is optimal, we have the condition 
and this is equivalent toΣ T = 0. Note that other equilibria are possible by taking λ t = λ T when t > T.
Remark 26 It can be proved that the linearity of the strategies assumed in the previous example implies that the equilibrium pricing rules have to be linear as well. This interesting result can be seen also in Aase et al.
(2012a).
Example 27 Another interesting example is that of Campi et al. (2013) . There, authors consider a defaultable stock. The default time is modeled as the first time that a Brownian motion, say B, hits the barrier −1, as in the above Example 22 . However in this case the default time, δ = inf{t ≥ 0, B t = −1}, is not known by the insider, but it is a stopping time for every trader. Instead, she observes the process B r(t) where r(t)
is a deterministic, increasing function with r(t) > t for t ∈ (0, 1), r(0) = 0, and r(1) = 1. This circumstance allows the insider to know in advance the default time. The horizon of the market is t = 1. They also consider a payoff of the kind f (B 1 ) in case of no default. Note that δ = r(τ ), where τ = inf{t ≥ 0, B r(t) = −1}. Then, in this example the release time r(τ ), the signal is η t = B r(t) and the fundamental value is V t = 1 {τ >t} E(f (B 1 )|B r(t) ).
Moreover the aggregate demand of noise traders follows a Brownian motion, say W , so Z = W. Even though τ , and consequently, δ is not known for the insider, they are predictable stopping times, and, by an extension of the case considered in section 3, we will have that, the price pressure is constant and that the optimal strategy moves prices to the fundamental one:
where (δ n ) is any increasing sequence of stopping times that grows to δ. To find the explicit form of an equilibrium strategy is not straightforward. However, if τ ≤ s ≤ V (τ ) an equilibrium strategy is obtained 
